WellBeing International

WBI Studies Repository
1997

A Scientific Conception of Animal Welfare that Reflects Ethical
Concerns
D. Fraser
University of British Columbia, dfraser@mail.ubc.ca

D. M. Weary
University of British Columbia

E. A. Pajor
McGill University

B. N. Milligan
McGill University

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/ethawel
Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Nature and
Society Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Fraser, D., Weary, D. M., Pajor, E. A., & Milligan, B. N. (1997). A scientific conception of animal welfare that
reflects ethical concerns. Animal welfare, 6, 187-205.

This material is brought to you for free and open access
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI
Studies Repository. For more information, please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

A Scientific Conception of Animal Welfare that
Reflects Ethical Concerns
1

1

2

2

D. Fraser , D.M. Weary , E.A. Pajor , B.N. Milligan
1
2

University of British Columbia
McGill University

KEYWORDS
animal welfare, ethics, health, scientific research, subjective experiences, stress, values
ABSTRACT
Scientific research on 'animal welfare' began because of ethical concerns over the quality
of life of animals, and the public looks to animal welfare research for guidance regarding
these concerns. The conception of animal welfare used by scientists must relate closely
to these ethical concerns if the orientation of the research and the interpretation of the
findings is to address them successfully.
At least three overlapping ethical concerns are commonly expressed regarding the
quality of life of animals: (1) that animals should lead natural lives through the
development and use of their natural adaptations and capabilities, (2) that animals should
feel well by being free from prolonged and intense fear, pain, and other negative states,
and by experiencing normal pleasures, and (3) that animals should function well, in the
sense of satisfactory health, growth and normal functioning of physiological and
behavioural systems. Various scientists have proposed restricted conceptions of animal
welfare that relate to only one or other of these three concerns. Some such conceptions
are based on value positions about what is truly important for the quality of life of animals
or about the nature of human responsibility for animals in their care. Others are
operational claims: (1) that animal welfare research must focus on the functioning of
animals because subjective experiences fall outside the realm of scientific enquiry, or (2)
that studying the functioning of animals is sufficient because subjective experiences and
functioning are closely correlated. We argue that none of these positions provides fully
satisfactory guidance for animal welfare research.
We suggest instead that ethical concerns about the quality of life of animals can be better
captured by recognizing three classes of problems that may arise when the adaptations
possessed by an animal do not fully correspond to the challenges posed by its current
environment. (1) If animals possess adaptations that no longer serve a significant
function in the new environment, then unpleasant subjective experiences may arise, yet
these may not be accompanied by significant disruption to biological functioning. Thus, a
bucket-fed calf may experience a strong, frustrated desire to suck, even though it obtains
adequate milk. (2) If the environment poses challenges for which the animal has no
corresponding adaptation, then functional problems may arise, yet these may not be
accompanied by significant effects on subjective feelings. Thus, a pig breathing polluted
air may develop lung damage without appearing to notice or mind the problem. (3) Where

animals have adaptations corresponding to the kinds of environmental challenges they
face, problems may still arise if the adaptations prove inadequate. For example, an
animal's thermoregulatory adaptations may be insufficient in a very cold environment
such that the animal both feels poorly and functions poorly. We propose that all three
types of problems are causes of ethical concern over the quality of life of animals and
that they together define the subject matter of animal welfare science.

Introduction
Two dog-owners met one day to walk their dogs together. One owner had grown up in a small family that
valued health, safety, and orderly, disciplined behaviour. The dog of this owner received regular
veterinary care, two meals a day of low-fat dog food, and was walked on a leash. The other owner had
grown up in a large community that valued conviviality, sharing of resources and close contact with the
natural world. This dog (the owner's third - the first two had been killed by cars) had burrs in its coat, was
fed generously but sporadically, and had never worn a collar in its life. Each owner, judging quality of life
from very different viewpoints, felt sorry for the other's dog.
People use many different criteria in judging what constitutes a good life for animals and how animals
ought to be treated. In recent decades, ethical concerns about the quality of life of animals have
increasingly become the subject of public policy and controversy. Consequently, society has turned to
science for guidance (Brambell 1965; Thorpe 1969) and animal welfare has become a focus of scientific
study. Thus, unlike many other scientific specialties, the field of animal welfare science owes its existence
not primarily to the curiosity of its scientific pioneers, but to ethical concerns extant in society.
In debating the direction of animal welfare research, scientists have proposed different conceptions and
definitions of animal welfare, and these have led to different research methods and different ways of
interpreting results (Duncan & Fraser 1997). These differences are not simply alternative scientific
approaches to assessing an empirical entity, comparable to alternative methods of estimating the
viscosity of a fluid or the metabolizable energy of a food (Fraser 1993). Any conception of animal welfare
inherently involves values because it pertains to what is better or worse for animals. The different
research approaches and interpretations that scientists use in assessing animal welfare reflect valueladen presuppositions about what is better or worse for animals (Tannenbaum 1991; Rollin 1995).
Moreover, these differences cannot be turned into purely empirical issues by any known type of scientific
research (Fraser 1995). But if values are so intimately involved, how are we to judge between a sound
conception of animal welfare and a faulty one?
The answer becomes clearer if we view animal welfare as a 'bridging concept' which links scientific
research to the ethical concerns that the research is intended to address. Thus, the conception of animal
welfare used by scientists needs to be amenable to scientific study; at the same time it must relate to
(and must direct scientific research toward) the relevant ethical issues. If the conception of animal welfare
used by scientists is substantially different from, or narrower than, that of other people, then the research
that the scientists do and the interpretation that they give to their findings may fail to address the very
issues that caused the research to be undertaken in the first place. To assess the adequacy of a scientific
conception of animal welfare we must, therefore, ask whether it relates appropriately to the major ethical
concerns that have given rise to animal welfare research.

However, two kinds of distortion can arise when scientists conceptualize or define animal welfare. First,
scientists may simply fail to recognize that value issues are involved and they may try to define animal
welfare as if it were a purely empirical concept. Stafleu et al (1996) noted that when scientists deal with a
value-related concept such as animal welfare, they are likely to redefine it so as to link it to other scientific
concepts (stress, immune competence, fitness) or to available methods of measurement (cortisol levels,
disease incidence). This makes the assessment of animal welfare seem like a purely empirical matter, but
in fact the underlying values are merely concealed. Second, because scientists have their own values
and ethical ideologies, they may define animal welfare in accordance with their particular ethical positions
but not in accordance with other widely held and defensible positions. In either case, scientists may adopt
such a narrow or idiosyncratic conception of animal welfare that their work does not properly address the
relevant ethical concerns.
As a further complication, several kinds of issues are often intertwined in scientific conceptions of animal
welfare. In addition to the value issues about what is important for the quality of life of animals, there are
also operational issues about the kind of information that can validly be used in the scientific assessment
of quality of life, together with semantic issues about how the term welfare should be used. When
scientists debate different conceptions of animal welfare. the value issues, operational issues, and
semantic issues are sometimes jumbled together and the true nature of the disagreement may be hard to
discern.
In this paper we attempt to disentangle the various issues and we propose a conception of animal welfare
intended to correspond to widely held ethical concerns about the quality of life of animals. Firstly, we
briefly review what we see as the three major ethical concerns that arise in discussion of animal welfare.
Then we present and criticize proposals by scientists that would restrict the scientific conception of animal
welfare to one or other of these concerns. Finally, we present an integrative model which, we propose,
captures the major ethical concerns that arise over the quality of life of animals.
Ethical concerns about the welfare of animals
First, let us be clear on the kind of ethical concern that has to do with the 'welfare' of animals. Various
ethical concerns arise over the treatment of animals. We may consider that certain butterflies should be
protected because the species is endangered, or that pigs should be housed in certain ways to prevent
environmental pollution, or that children should not mistreat animals because such actions may make
children cruel or destructive. These are ethical concerns about the treatment of animals, but the primary
concern in these cases centres on genetic conservation, environmental integrity, or human virtue rather
than the quality of life, per se, of the animals. In contrast, concerns over the welfare of animals arise when
we consider that protecting the quality of life of animals is not only of instrumental value as a means to
some external goal, but of importance in itself. In such cases we consider that the quality of life of animals
has 'inherent worth' in the sense of Taylor (1986). or that animals are' intrinsically valuable' and that their
own interests are legitimate objects of moral concern (Rollin 1992). For brevity we will refer to these
concerns simply as 'quality-of-life' concerns.
Social critics, ethicists and others have expressed three different but overlapping types of quality-of-life
concerns (see Duncan & Fraser 1997). First are 'natural-living' concerns which emphasize the
naturalness of the circumstances in which animals are kept and the ability of an animal to live according
to its 'nature'. For example, Brambell (1965) criticized forms of confinement that frustrate most of the
natural behaviour of animals (Table 1, a) and Lindgren (Anonymous 1989b, Table 1, b) called for animals
to be raised in the sunshine and fresh air. Lindgren evidently believed that living outdoors would promote
happiness, but Dawkins (1980) pointed out that some people still consider it better for animals to live
freely rather than in captivity, despite the suffering and threats to health and survival that natural living

entails. Rollin (1993, Table 1, c) proposed that each animal species has an inherent, genetically encoded
'nature' (its 'telos') and that good welfare requires that an animal be allowed to live in accordance with its
telos.
Table 1. Sample quotations indicating different positions on animal quality-of-Iife issues by animal care
professionals, social commentators and ethicists.
a

'In principle we disapprove of a degree of confinement of an animal which necessarily frustrates most of the
major activities which make up its natural behaviour .. .' (Brambell 1965)

b

' ... it might even be possible to guarantee that young animals ... get a little summertime happiness, at least a
temporary reprieve from the floors of barns and the crowded spaces where the poor animals are stored until
they die. Let them see the sun just once, get away from the murderous roar of the fans. Let them get to breathe
fresh air for once, instead of manure gas' (in Anonymous 1989b)

c

'It is likely that the emerging social ethic for animals ... will demand from scientists data relevant to a much
increased concept of welfare. Not only will welfare mean control of pain and suffering. it will also entail
nurturing and fulfillment of the animals' natures, which I call telos.' (Rollin 1993)

d

'Have we the right to rob (animals) of all pleasure in life simply to make more money more quickly out of their
carcasses?' (Harrison 1964)

e

'The welfare of managed animals is dependent upon the degree to which they can adapt without suffering to
the environments provided by man.' (Carpenter 1980)

f

' ... there can be no moral justification for regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less important
than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans.' (Singer 1990)

g

'Good health is the birthright of every animal that we rear, whether intensively or otherwise. If it becomes
diseased we have failed in our duty to the animal and subjected it to a degree of suffering that cannot be
readily estimated.' (Sainsbury 1986)

h

' ... my experience has been that more problems of animal welfare are to be found in the extensive – the open
range - the old-fashioned methods and that by-and-Iarge the standard of welfare among animals kept in the so
called 'intensive' systems is higher. On balance I feel that the animal is better cared for; it is certainly much
freer from disease and attack by its mates; it receives much better attention from the attendants, is sure of
shelter and bedding and a reasonable amount of good food and water.' (Taylor 1972)

A second type of concern (which we will call 'feelings-based') emphasizes the affective experiences
('feelings', 'emotions') of animals (Table 1, d-f). Thus, a good life for animals is thought to depend on
freedom from suffering in the sense of prolonged or intense pain, fear, hunger and other negative states;
some commentators also emphasize positive states such as comfort, contentment and pleasure.
Thirdly 'functioning-based' concerns, held especially by many farmers, veterinarians and others with
practical responsibility for animal care, accord special importance to health and the 'normal' or
'satisfactory' functioning of the animal's biological systems. Thus, Sainsbury (1986, Table 1, g) wrote of
protecting animal health as a duty that people owe to animals in their care, and Taylor (1972, Table I, h)
emphasized shelter, nutrition and health care as advantages that more than compensate for the
unnaturalness of keeping animals in confinement.
Some scientists have proposed conceptions of animal welfare that include two or all three of the above
concerns. For example the 'five freedoms' of the Farm Animal Welfare Council of the United Kingdom
refer to affective experience (eg fear, hunger), biological functioning (eg injury, disease) and performance
of natural behaviour (see Ewbank 1988). Others have proposed a hierarchical ordering of factors
whereby certain aspects are more important than others, yet all contribute to an animal's welfare (Curtis
1987; Hurnik 1993). Yet other scientists have suggested a logical ordering whereby the animal's
experience is the ultimate concern but satisfactory biological functioning is important at least partly
because it influences the animal's experience (Gonyou 1993; Appleby et al 1996).

However, other scientists have proposed more limited conceptions of animal welfare centred on one or
other of the three types of concerns. These narrower conceptions limit the scope of animal welfare
research by ruling out or de-emphasizing certain measures in favour of others. However, we need to ask
whether any of these narrower conceptions adequately reflects the widely held quality-of-life concerns
that have given rise to scientific research on animal welfare.
Claims that welfare should be defined in terms of natural living
Some scientists have adopted a natural-living conception by proposing that an animal's welfare depends
on its being allowed to perform its 'natural' behaviour and live a 'natural' life.
Among scientists, one of the earliest natural-living approaches held that welfare would be reduced if
animals could not perform their full 'behavioural repertoire' (eg Kiley-Worthington 1989, Table 2, a). This
approach developed in response to concerns over highly restrictive and unnatural forms of animal
housing. However, the behavioural repertoire of animals includes many activities that are adaptations to
cope with adverse circumstances. For example, piglets huddle in the cold, pant in the heat and give
characteristic 'distress' calls when isolated from their littermates. Environments that bring out these
behaviours are likely to increase suffering, not reduce it; hence, performance of the full behavioural
repertoire has been widely criticized as a guide to animal welfare (Dawkins 1980; Hughes & Duncan
1988).
Table 2. Sample quotations indicating different conceptions of animal welfare proposed by animal welfare
researchers.
a

'If we believe in evolution ... then in order to avoid suffering, it is necessary over a period of time for the animal
to perform all the behaviors in its repertoire because it is all functional...' (Kiley-Worthington 1989)

b

' ... neither health nor lack of stress nor fitness is necessary and/or sufficient to conclude that an animal has
good welfare. Welfare is dependent on what animals feel.' (Duncan 1993)

c

'To be concerned about animal welfare is to be concerned with the subjective feelings of animals, particularly
the unpleasant subjective feelings of suffering and pain' (Dawkins 1988)

d

'Poor welfare occurs in situations in which ... there is reduced fitness or clear indications that fitness will be
reduced' (Broom 1991b)

e

' ... the only defensible measurement of well-being in animals is to determine if the animal is suffering from
stress. Furthermore, I believe that the most appropriate indicator of stress is the appearance of a
prepathological state.' (Moberg 1985)

f

'Recently, scientists have suggested that if an animal perceives that it feels poorly (as measured primarily by
behaviour) then the animal is said to be in a poor state of welfare. I dismiss this view as simplistic and
inappropriate. I suggest that an animal is in a poor state of welfare only when physiological systems are
disturbed to the point that survival or reproduction are impaired.' (McGlone 1993)

g

'Although the animal's perception of its condition must serve as the basis for well-being, research in this area is
only beginning. At the present time much can be accomplished by using more traditional approaches involving
behavioural, physiological and pathological studies.' (Gonyou 1993)

h

'Welfare is determined by the state of the animal's psychological processes. Each of these processes must
have evolved to represent some aspect of biological fitness ... Thus, determinants of welfare can be described
as psychological representations of attributes of biological fitness.' (Baxter 1983)

However, the proposal by Rollin (1993, Table 1, c) - that a high level of welfare requires the nurturing and
fulfilment of the animal's genetically encoded 'nature' - provides a more general and potentially more
useful conception if it can be interpreted operationally in a biological context. We suggest that the
genetically encoded 'nature' of an animal can be viewed as (1) the set of adaptations that an animal
possesses as a result of its evolutionary history, perhaps as modified through domestication and the

animal's own experiences; and (2) the set of genetically encoded instructions that guide the animal's
normal ontogenic development. Thus, to say that animals should be allowed to live according to their
'natures' would mean that animals should be allowed to live in a manner that corresponds to their
adaptations and to have the type of ontogenic development that is normal for the species. For 'higher'
animals at least, the adaptations produced by natural selection constitute not simply a behavioural
repertoire of actions each with a characteristic frequency of performance, but a set of conditional rules
that govern the performance of behaviour. For example, the adaptations possessed by a pig include not
simply the actions of panting and huddling but the conditional rules to pant when hot and huddle when
cold. Thus, to keep a pig in accordance with its adaptations does not necessarily require that it must pant
and huddle, but that it should be able to use these adaptations when circumstances require them.
This conception of welfare is generally compatible with feelings- and functioning-based interpretations,
but it tends to be more inclusive. The pig that cannot exercise its adaptation of huddling in the cold may
suffer as a result (a feelings-based criterion) and become ill (a functioning-based criterion). In addition,
however, some people may consider that the pig's quality of life is reduced if it cannot' be a pig' by rooting
in a forest, or if a bird cannot fly, or if a ruminant is fed a diet that does not allow it to ruminate. Concerns
of this type are clearly covered by the view that animals should be allowed to live according to their
natural adaptations, whereas they are not so obviously covered by an emphasis on health, survival, or
subjective feelings.
Nonetheless, living in a natural manner is no guarantee that the full range of ethical concerns over the
quality of life of animals will be satisfied. Even if an animal is kept in a natural environment where it can
live according to its adaptations, it may still suffer and become ill if its adaptations are insufficient to meet
the challenges to which it is exposed. Furthermore, the concept provides little guidance on many
important animal welfare issues such as the use of analgesia, euthanasia and medication. And despite
the general biological interpretation that we propose above, significant empirical and conceptual problems
remain in defining the 'nature' of a given animal (Duncan & Fraser 1997). Thus, while a naturaI-living
conception is a useful way to expand our notion of animal welfare, it does not by itself provide a sufficient
criterion for defining the concept.
Claims that welfare should be defined in terms of the feelings of animals
The capacity of animals to experience affective states (feelings, emotions) plays a singularly important
role in ethical concern over the quality of their lives. Most of the writers quoted in Table 1, although
emphasizing different aspects of animal care, relate their concerns in some way to animals experiencing
states such as suffering or pleasure. In line with these views, many scientists have put particular
emphasis on the subjective experience of animals in developing scientific conceptions of animal welfare
(Table 2, b-c).
But should scientists restrict their conception of animal welfare (and hence the orientation of their
research) only to the affective experience of animals? Duncan (1993, 1996) made a proposal of this type.
He noted that plants can function well or poorly, and can be healthy or unhealthy, yet he suggested that
the term welfare cannot 'be applied sensibly' to plants (Duncan 1993). Rather, Duncan suggested that we
apply welfare only to entities that we believe to have subjective feelings and he concluded that for
something to be said to affect an animal's welfare it must influence how the animal feels (Table 2, b).
However, the link between the subjective experience of animals and concern over their welfare can be
viewed in three different ways.

1) The term 'welfare' should he used only where feelings are involved
Duncan's proposal could be construed as a purely semantic claim about how the term welfare ought to be
used. We have suggested (above) that an animal welfare concern is a concern about the quality of life of
an animal where quality of life is viewed as having inherent worth. The semantic claim that the term
welfare should be applied only to situations involving subjective experience would not alter or limit the
scope of quality-of-life concerns, but it would limit the use of the term welfare in discussing these
concerns. We might, for example, still consider that normal functioning of the body and natural living can
be of inherent worth independently of any influence on suffering and pain, but we would consider it a
semantic error to apply the term welfare to these quality-of-life concerns.
Such restricted use of the term could lead to confusion. According to established usage, welfare and wellbeing refer more broadly to 'good fortune, health, happiness and prosperity', 'the state of being or doing
well', 'thriving or successful progress in life'. and 'a good or satisfactory condition of existence'
(Anonymous 1984, 1989a). Thus, current usage does not restrict welfare only to subjective feelings.
Furthermore, limiting welfare only to feelings separates welfare from health in a manner contrary to
common usage. For example, in a habitual cigarette smoker, smoking causes pleasure and relieves
distress; the resulting lung damage causes little or no suffering in the short term and even if it does so in
the future, there are no solid grounds to conclude that the future suffering will outweigh the pleasure.
Thus, a strictly feelings-based definition of welfare might lead us to say that cigarettes reduce the health
of smokers but may improve their welfare. As Duncan (1996) noted, limiting the term welfare to subjective
feelings produces 'anomalies' of this type.
In terms of animal welfare science, a purely semantic proposal would have no implications for the types of
research needed to address ethical concerns over the quality)' of life of animals; it would merely affect the
language we use to describe this research.
2) Concerns about animal welfare arise because of the capacity of animals for subjective
experience
Alternatively, the relationship between subjective experience and welfare can be viewed as a claim about
the kinds of organisms to which we should apply quality-of-Iife concerns. According to this view, the belief
that certain kinds of animals can experience subjective feelings creates a morally relevant similarity
between them and ourselves. Consequently we accord to those animals moral considerations that we
might otherwise apply only to humans. This view does not limit welfare concerns to the actual subjective
experience of animals. We might, for example, consider that the health of sentient animals is a legitimate
quality-of-Iife concern whether or not it affects suffering and pleasure.
Some animal welfare scientists appear to take this view by considering that for sentient animals, good
biological functioning is important in and of itself, not merely as a means of affecting the animal's
subjective experience. Ewbank (1988) stressed freedom from both malnutrition (a term that implies
biological functioning) and hunger (a term that implies feelings). Hughes (1976) and Hurnik (1993)
stressed the importance of physical and mental harmony between animals and their environment. In
these cases, there may be an unspoken assumption that malnutrition and physical disharmony will
necessarily lead to suffering. However, Hurnik (1993) proposed explicitly that what the animal 'needs' (a
term with connotations of biological functioning) is more important than what it 'desires' (a term with
connotations of subjective feelings); and Broom (1991a,b) proposed that injury and disease involve
reduced welfare whether or not the animal is aware of the problem.

Ethicists have developed this idea more explicitly. For Regan (1983), the well-being of an animal depends
not only on its 'preference interests' (eg what it likes or dislikes), but also its 'welfare interests' which
include things that 'benefit' the animal whether or not the animal consciously desires or pursues them.
Rollin (1992) noted that while pain and pleasure are very important in our perception of moral duties
toward other humans, they are not the only considerations; rather we may consider that normal health,
education, and development of a person's natural capabilities are of value independent of their influence
on pleasure and suffering. Regarding other species, Rollin (1992) proposed that moral concern for
sentient animals extends 'beyond pleasure and pain to the essential characteristics of conscious life itself'
and he saw pleasure and pain as 'tools' that enable the animal to achieve the broader goals of fulfilling its
'needs' and 'nature'. With captive chimpanzees, for example, we may consider that giving the animal
enough freedom to develop normal perceptual and cognitive capabilities is a quality-of-life issue (much
like encouraging the intellectual development of children) even though we might believe we could better
eliminate pain, hunger and other forms of suffering in a more limiting environment.
In summary, this approach views the capacity for subjective experience as a trait that identifies the kinds
of animals that qualify for quality-of-Iife concerns, but it does not limit these concerns to the actual
subjective experience of animals.
3) Concerns about animal welfare are concerns about the subjective experience of animals
Thirdly, the link between welfare and subjective experience may be seen as the more restrictive claim
that concerns about the quality of life of an animal are concerns about its subjective experience (Table 2,
b-c). According to this view, changes in physiology, behaviour, or even health cannot legitimately be
viewed as quality-of-life concerns unless they affect how the animal feels. If a disease causes pain, we
should prevent the disease in order to prevent the pain; but if a disease (say, painless lung damage) does
not affect how an animal feels, then it is not a quality-of-life issue any more than a disease of carrots or
the malfunctioning of a machine, although we may still wish to prevent it for some other reason such as
more efficient animal production.
This conception of animal welfare reflects the ethical position of Utilitarianism (Singer 1990) which relates
all ethical decisions to the principle of minimizing suffering and maximizing pleasure. Such a restricted
conception of animal welfare does not appear (initially, at least) to cover the broader ethical concerns
described above, such as protecting the health of animals and allowing them to live and develop
according to their natures.
Perhaps, however, even these broader concerns over natural living and biological functioning might, on
careful analysis, turn out to be proximate concerns that people hold because of an ultimate concern about
the subjective experience of animals. Thus, perhaps an animal's 'needs' (Hurnik 1993) or 'welfare
interests' (Regan 1983), although not consciously desired or pursued by the animal, are seen as
important for its welfare precisely because they will lead to greater feelings of satisfaction or pleasure in
the long term. However, even if we were to adopt the philosophical stance that all quality-of-Iife concerns
are ultimately concerns about subjective experience, it does not follow that animal welfare research
should be limited to the subjective experience of animals, because of the following distinction.
Some questions about the subjective experience of animals can plausibly be addressed by scientific
research. For example, we might ask whether surgical castration of calves causes less pain than rubberband castration (Molony et aI1995), or whether mechanical capturing of chickens causes less fear than
manual capturing (Duncan et al 1986). In these cases the concern involves a particular subjective state
(eg pain) over a limited time, and scientists have proposed plausible empirical means of answering the
questions.

However, other ethically important questions about subjective experience cannot be answered empirically
for either technical or fundamental reasons. For example, we might ask (a) whether keeping a bird in a
cage reduces its welfare by depriving it of the pleasure of flying, or (b) whether prolonging the life of a sick
dog reduces its welfare because its suffering outweighs its enjoyment of living, or (c) whether keeping a
cow in a barn improves its welfare because the protection from cold, hunger and possible injury
outweighs the frustration and other negative experiences caused by confinement. These questions about
animal welfare are indeed questions about the animal's subjective experience, but in these cases
scientists are unable to provide empirical answers. This inability arises because there is not yet any
accepted method to quantify the pleasure experienced by an animal (example a), or because there is no
purely empirical means to balance suffering against enjoyment (example b) or to combine different
negative states into overall indices (example c). In such cases we often resort to other types of
information (biological functioning, natural living) using assumptions about how the subjective experience
of animals is likely to be influenced, perhaps based on analogies with ourselves (Stafleu et al 1992).
Thus, even if we consider that concerns about animal welfare are, in reality, concerns about subjective
experience, animal welfare research cannot be limited to the subjective experience of animals because
science cannot yet, and perhaps cannot in principle, give empirical answers to many ethically relevant
questions regarding the subjective experience of animals. The net result for animal welfare science is
much the same as in subsection 2: moral concern about the quality of life of animals arises because of
the animals' capacity for subjective experience, but the study of subjective experience will not provide all
the necessary answers.
Claims that welfare should be defined in terms of the functioning of animals
Disease, injury, malnutrition and other disturbances to normal biological functioning have been a common
element in ethical concerns over the treatment of animals (eg Taylor 1972, Sainsbury 1986, see Table 1).
In line with these concerns, some scientists have based their conception of animal welfare on the
biological functioning of animals, often linking welfare to biological concepts such as fitness and stress
(Table 2, d-f).
This approach, however, raises an unresolved issue. An animal's responses to environmental challenge
can be seen as a continuum ranging from minor, routine adjustments, through to significant disturbance
and abnormality. For example, an animal that is exposed to cold will undergo certain (probably
unconscious) physiological adjustments in blood flow and perspiration rate. If these are inadequate, the
animal may begin to feel cold and this may motivate a behavioural response such as seeking warmth. If
the problem is very persistent, more deleterious changes may occur such as depressed immune
competence and greater risk of infectious disease. A key issue in conceptualizing animal welfare is how
to decide where, in this continuum, the animal's welfare can be said to be affected (Barnett & Hemsworth
1990; MendI 1991).
For scientists taking a feeling-based approach, the body's responses to challenge are relevant to welfare
only when the animal's conscious experience becomes involved, and the more intense and prolonged the
unpleasant or pleasant experience, the greater the relevance to the animal's welfare. For those who
conceptualize animal welfare in terms of biological functioning, however, there is no such obvious point in
the continuum of bodily responses where welfare can be said to be affected. Some scientists have
proposed solutions based on quantitative measures such as certain degrees of change in endocrine
responses (Barnett & Hemsworth 1990) or certain amounts of stereotyped behaviour (Broom & Johnson
1993). Moberg (1985) proposed a more general solution. Moberg noted that stressors (eg cold or
crowding) can lead to impaired health and survival, but that these severe effects are preceded by 'prepathological states' (eg reduced immune competence) predictive of some tangible harm to the health of

the animal. Moberg (1985, Table 2, e) proposed that pre-pathological states are the most appropriate
indicators of impaired well-being in that they identify (at an early stage) conditions that threaten tangible
harm to the normal functioning of animals.
But can an emphasis on threatened or actual disturbance to biological functioning give a fully satisfactory
conception of animal welfare for use in science? Three such positions have been proposed.
1) All that matters is that animals function well
McGlone (1993, Table 2, f) proposed that an animal's welfare can be considered poor 'only when
physiological systems are disturbed to the point that survival or reproduction are impaired'. Thus, states
such as pain, fear and hunger would not be seen as relevant to welfare unless accompanied by some
tangible threat to health or survival. This position is, in essence, an ethical stance; in fact, McGlone
(1993) suggested that it provides a way of distinguishing between 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' welfare,
and he felt that it would bring decisions about animal welfare into line with human welfare assistance
programs in the United States. However, if animal welfare research were to be limited in this manner, it
obviously would not respond to the widely held ethical concerns over animals' subjective experiences
(suffering, enjoyment) which are commonly seen as being of moral relevance in themselves (eg Brambell
1965; Carpenter 1980; Midgley 1983; Singer 1990; Rollin 1992).
2) We must study functioning because we cannot study feelings
Scientists have also advanced two operational proposals that tend to focus animal welfare research on
measures of biological functioning by declaring research on the subjective experience of animals to be
impossible or unnecessary.
One such position holds that the subjective experience of animals, not being open to direct observation,
falls outside the realm of scientific enquiry (van Rooijen 1981; Kennedy 1992); therefore. if we are to
study animal welfare scientifically, we must conceptualize welfare in terms of biological functioning (or
possibly natural living) because scientific study cannot be applied to subjective feelings. (Previously we
proposed that some ethically relevant questions about the subjective experience of animals cannot be
answered empirically; here we are discussing the stronger claim that all subjective experience of animals
is, in principle, beyond scientific enquiry).
This position is derived from Positivism which has influenced science for over a century. According to
Positivist thinking, scientists should concern themselves with the observable phenomena of nature (as
opposed to metaphysical questions or immaterial forces) and should avoid theorizing about processes
that cannot be observed directly (Kolakowski 1968). In ethology and comparative psychology, Positivist
thinking led to the view that feelings and emotions should not be used as explanatory concepts in the
study of behaviour, and in some cases to the stronger view that science cannot help us to understand the
subjective experiences of animals at all (Rollin 1990).
This Positivist position is not a 'theory' in the traditional sense, because it is not ultimately testable or
refutable. Rather it is a 'stance' in the sense of Dennett (1987): a conceptual framework that scientists
adopt to interpret observations and guide further empirical study. The legacy of Positivism in the study of
animal behaviour has been widely criticized by Midgley (1983), Dawkins (1990), Griffin (1992), Rollin
(1992) and many others. Today many animal welfare scientists have tacitly jettisoned the Positivist stance
simply by presuming that animals do have subjective experiences such as fear, pain and frustration, and
that an animal's actions, preferences, vocalizations and physiological changes can shed light on these
subjective experiences.

Drawing valid inferences about the subjective experiences of animals from behavioural and physiological
measures involves many pitfalls, and scientists who attempt this will require rigorous thinking and
carefully conceived research methods to ensure that they do not simply fall prey to the errors that
Positivism helped to avoid (see Dawkins 1980, 1990, 1993). However, attempts to use the methods of
science to improve our understanding of the subjective experiences of animals cannot be dismissed as
impossible simply because such attempts depart from the influential Positivist stance.
3) We can study functioning instead of feelings because the two are intimately related
A second operational argument holds that the functioning of animals provides a fully satisfactory reflection
of their subjective feelings. Feelings (fear, pain, pleasure) are commonly viewed as adaptations that
motivate an animal to behave in ways that promote good biological functioning (Dawkins 1980). Thus,
injury causes pain and pain is viewed as adaptive because it encourages the animal to avoid further
injury. In line with this view many scientists, although believing that the subjective experiences of animals
are of primary concern in animal welfare, advocate studies of biological functioning as a less problematic
form of research which reflects subjective experience (Gonyou 1993, Table 2, g). Some scientists have
proposed the similar but stronger view that the link between feelings and functioning is so close that the
subjective experiences of animals will be adequately reflected by measures of biological functioning.
Baxter (1983) outlined a proposal of this type by suggesting close links between the subjective feelings of
animals, their agricultural productivity and their 'biological fitness' (roughly, their ability to leave viable
offspring - see 'fitness' in McFarland 1981). Baxter (1983) took the feelings-based view that animal
welfare 'is determined by whether the animal is hungry, thirsty, sexually frustrated, bored, physically
uncomfortable and many other experiences.' He suggested that these feelings evolved because they
motivate the animal to take the actions needed to promote a high level of functioning. Thus, subjective
feelings (which determine an animal's welfare) are 'psychological representations of attributes of
biological fitness' (Table 2, h). Furthermore, Baxter suggested that the main features of fitness (such as
the number and quality of offspring produced) are also the key elements of agricultural productivity.
Therefore, 'biological fitness and agricultural productivity are in general correspondence' and each should
be closely linked to animal welfare. This proposal would allow us to assess animal welfare using
measures of biological functioning - or even productivity in the case of agricultural animals - as an
adequate reflection of the animal's subjective experiences.
This view clearly has merit in some situations. For example, we expect chronically malnourished animals
to have low rates of survival and reproduction, low agricultural productivity and to experience the
unpleasant feelings of hunger or malaise. By solving the nutritional problem we expect to improve both
functioning and subjective experience.
However, as Baxter himself noted, there may be important differences between the environment in which
an animal is kept and the environment in which the animal's ancestors evolved, leaving the animal
motivated to perform activities that no longer contribute to fitness or agricultural productivity. Baxter
(1983) made minimal mention of such cases (escape from predators was his only example), but in reality
non-functional adaptations are common problems in the management of captive or domestic animals. For
example, domestic pigs confined in a barren environment may show restless, destructive behaviour
before parturition, probably reflecting a high level of motivation to find and prepare a nest (Widowski &
Curtis 1990); prolonged stereotyped behaviour, seen when restrained sows are fed limited rations,
possibly indicating thwarted motivation to escape, forage, or explore (Rushen et al 1993); and sucking
and chewing behaviour redirected to the bodies of penmates, probably reflecting normal food-finding
motivation redirected in abnormal ways (Smith & Penny 1986). These various activities are arguably
derived from motivations that served important functions in the environment in which the ancestors of pigs

evolved and that persist in confinement even though the activities no longer serve their original function.
These are, furthermore, among the most commonly cited animal welfare concerns in pig production. The
presumption in these cases appears to be that animals will suffer if they experience a high and persistent
motivation to perform actions that the environment does not permit. This presumption, if correct, provides
important exceptions to the view that unpleasant feelings are reliably connected to disturbed health,
survival or agricultural productivity.
An integrative model
In summary, none of the above conceptions of animal welfare relates in a fully satisfactory manner to the
major ethical concerns over the quality of life of animals. We propose that these concerns can be better
conceptualized using the model shown in Figure 1. Circle A in the figure represents the set of adaptations
possessed by an animal mainly as a result of its evolutionary history and perhaps modified and
augmented by genetic changes during domestication and the individual's own learning and experiences.
Adaptations can involve the animal's anatomy (growing thick fur in winter), physiology (catabolizing
glycogen under cold conditions), or behaviour (moving to a warm environment). Some adaptations
involve subjective feelings such as hunger, cold and pain that motivate animals to act in certain ways or
that stimulate certain forms of learning. Circle B represents the challenges faced by the animal in its
current circumstances. Challenges may include cold temperatures, exposure to pathogens, and
aggression from pen mates.
Figure 1. Conceptual model illustrating three broad classes of problems that may arise when the adaptations
possessed by the animal (circle A) make an imperfect fit to the challenges it faces in the circumstances in
which it is kept (circle B). We propose that the different classes of problems, taken together, cover the major
ethical concerns that arise over the quality of life of animals and constitute the subject matter of animal
welfare research.

In general, if an animal's current circumstances correspond closely to the circumstances in which the
genotype evolved and the individual developed, then we expect close correspondence between the
adaptations that the animal possesses and the challenges it faces. This would be represented by a large
area of overlap in Figure 1. For most captive or domestic animals in artificial environments, we expect
imperfect correspondence between the adaptations and the challenges, producing the three areas in
Figure 1. In each of these areas, a distinct class of problems may arise; and we propose that these three
classes of problems together cover the major types of quality-of-life concerns that constitute the subject
matter of animal welfare research.
In area 1 to the left of the overlap, we find adaptations possessed by the animal which no longer serve an
important function, often because the original function is now achieved in some other way. Some such
adaptations (eg the camouflaging stripes of a zebra) can be nonfunctional in a captive environment
without having any obvious impact on the animal's quality of life. However, if an adaptation involves a
strong affective experience (hunger, pain, desire to escape) that motivates some form of behaviour, then
preventing the behaviour may leave the animal experiencing a strong motivation to perform an action that
cannot be carried out, and/or failing to experience the positive feeling associated with performing the
behaviour. For example, a calf that is fed milk from a bucket may make persistent attempts to suck on
neighbouring animals (de Passille et at 1992), presumably because a strong motivation to suck was
important for adequate milk intake in the environment of evolution. Preventing the behaviour may leave
the calf with a strong, unfulfilled desire to suck. However, because the behaviour's original function (milk
intake) is now met in other ways, prevention of the behaviour may not lead to clear impairment of
biological functioning (malnutrition), although other detrimental effects may sometimes arise if the animal
is prevented from using its natural means of achieving the outcome (de Passille et al 1993). Similarly,
various forms of stereotyped behaviour may reflect persistent motivation to perform actions that are no
longer needed for health and survival in the animal's current environment (Rushen et aI 1993). In such
cases, animals may experience negative subjective feelings, or fail to experience positive ones, without
necessarily showing any impairment of biological functioning. Sambraus (1981) referred to such problems
as 'immaterial suffering'.
In area 2 to the right of the overlap (Figure 1), we find challenges in the environment for which the animal
lacks corresponding adaptations. For example, most animals, having evolved in unpolluted environments,
show little avoidance of some types of environmental contamination. Some species of fish fail to avoid
certain contaminants (phenol, selenium) even at levels that cause serious damage or death (Giattina &
Garton 1983; Hartwell et al 1989). Similarly pigs show little avoidance of sustained exposure to ammonia
at levels that cause damage to the respiratory system (Morrison et al 1993; Jones et al 1996). These
animals, like human smokers, appear to suffer no significant discomfort until the damage is far advanced.
Similarly, animals may be poorly equipped to avoid becoming obese if concentrated food is readily
available, to avoid losing physical condition in housing systems where exercise is not required, and to
avoid pathogens when kept in close contact with other animals. These problems may seriously impair the
biological functioning of animals, yet the animals may show no evidence of motivation to avoid the harm,
nor any clear sign of suffering, at least until pathological changes are well established. In such cases,
animals may undergo impaired biological functioning without necessarily showing evidence of effects on
subjective feelings.
In the central area (area 3), the animal faces challenges for which it has corresponding adaptations. For
example, the environment may impose fluctuating temperatures and the animal will have certain
thermoregulatory adaptations. In some cases, these adaptations will include an affective experience (eg
feeling cold) that motivates corrective action. Problems may arise in area 3 when the adaptations prove

inadequate for the degree of challenge. In such cases there is likely to be substantial correspondence
between feelings and functioning. For example, if cold temperatures are too severe for an animal's
thermoregulatory responses, then we expect the animal to feel cold as well as showing corresponding
disturbance of bodily functioning.
We propose that the model shown in Figure 1 provides a way of conceptualizing the range of quality-oflife concerns that animal welfare research needs to address. Concerns about the subjective experience of
animals will arise mainly in area 1 where an otherwise well functioning animal may be highly motivated to
behave in ways that the environment prevents, and in area 3 where negative subjective experience is
more likely to be correlated with impaired biological functioning. Concerns about biological functioning will
arise especially in area 2, where problems of biological functioning may arise without the subjective
experience of the animal being involved, and in area 3. Natural-living concerns will arise in areas 1 and 2
where the animal's adaptations are not well matched to the challenges it faces.
Animal welfare implications and conclusions
The conception of animal welfare that scientists adopt has a determining influence on the type of animal
welfare research they undertake (Duncan & Fraser 1997) and, hence, on the type of information available
to society for deciding animal welfare issues. In fact, scientists advocating restrictive conceptions of
animal welfare sometimes propose corresponding restrictions on the scope of animal welfare research.
Thus, Kiley-Worthington (1989), using a natural-living conception of animal welfare, suggested that
research on animals' environmental preferences is not needed; McGlone (1993) suggested that his
functioning-based conception eliminated the need for behavioural research to understand the subjective
experience of animals; and Duncan (1996) proposed that because an animal's feelings 'govern' its
welfare, 'it is feelings that should be measured in order to assess welfare.' We suggest, instead, that if
animal welfare research is to address major ethical concerns about the quality of life of animals, then the
conception of animal welfare used by scientists needs to reflect the full range of major ethical concerns
extant in society.
Different conceptions of animal welfare can, of course, lead to conflicting conclusions about how animals
ought to be treated. Observer A, favouring a functioning-based conception, may conclude that the welfare
of a group of sows tethered in stalls is high because the animals are well fed, reproducing efficiently and
free from disease and injury. Observer B, using a feelings-based conception, concludes that the welfare
of the same animals is poor because they give vocalizations that are thought to indicate frustration, and
they escape from the stalls whenever the chance arises. Observer C. relying on a natural-living
conception, agrees that the sows' welfare is poor because stalls are unnatural environments which
prevent the animals' natural behaviour.
It would be comforting to think that science could arbitrate such disagreements by showing, either
empirically or logically, that the quality of life of animals really depends only on biological functioning, or
only on subjective experience, or only on natural living. We have argued instead that the positions taken
by scientists do not demonstrate that one of these positions is correct and the others are not. Rather,
these disagreements stem from value-laden presuppositions about what is important for the quality of life
of animals. In such cases, science may provide relevant empirical information, but science cannot turn
such disagreements into purely empirical matters by adopting a particular conception of animal welfare to
the exclusion of others.
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